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FOREIGNERS IN BURMA: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
Rachel E. Ryon † 
Abstract: Burma is hailed as a great democratic success story: a once-rogue 
nation holding elections, releasing political prisoners, and promising human rights 
reforms.  The people elected to Parliament Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the 
democratic movement who was under house arrest for more than twenty years.  The 
world responded with applause and open pocketbooks.  In April of 2012, Ban Ki-moon, 
Secretary General of the United Nations, asked members to lift their sanctions on the 
formerly “rogue” nation and begin investing.  But for a resource-rich country with a long 
track record of corruption, this flood of foreign investment will likely provide more 
opportunities for human rights violations and environmental destruction.   
Burma’s Parliament recently revised the country’s foreign investment law to 
provide guidelines for its new investors.  Given Burma’s relatively new Constitution and 
brand new foreign investment law, what will the legal landscape regarding the protection 
of human rights and the environment look like during this time of transition and 
economic acceleration?  Foreign investors should agree to undertake projects only where 
impact benefit agreements are successfully negotiated, proceed cautiously in Burma’s 
historically corrupt oil and gas industry, and engage in non-financial reporting in order to 
ensure compliance with international human rights and environmental standards. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In September of 2012 the Obama administration formally lifted nearly 
all of the economic sanctions against Burma1 that had been in place since the 
late 1990s.2  The United States’ move coincided with many other Western 
countries’ similar easing of trade sanctions against the former pariah nation.3  
These changes were in response to the reforms enacted by Burmese 
President Thein Sein over the previous year.4  After President Thein Sein 
                                                
†  The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Rosenbaum and Paul Donowitz for their support 
and guidance, and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard work and dedication.  
The author would also like to acknowledge the work of human rights groups such as Free Burma Rangers, 
the U.S. Campaign of Burma, Partners Relief and Development, and EarthRights International, whose work 
inspired this comment.  
1  Many call the country by its former name, Burma, which the ruling military junta changed to 
“Myanmar” in 1989.  The author will refer to the country as Burma, but will retain the language used by 
the individual sources when referencing their statements.  
2  Sam Holmes & Celine Fernandez, Myanmar Awaits Sanction-Lift Effect:  Impact of U.S. Move to 
Ease Export Ban Could Take Years Because of Poor Infrastructure, Preparedness, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044454920457802219312 0833754.html. 
3  Annie Lowrey, U.S. Sanctions on Myanmar Formally Eased, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/us-sanctions-on-myanmar-formally-eased.html?r=0.  
4  Burma Sanctions:  Obama Lifts Restrictions on U.S. Firms, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18798162.  
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was sworn in as leader of a “nominally civilian government,” he enacted a 
series of democratic reforms.5  These reforms granted amnesty to political 
prisoners, allowed peaceful demonstrations, freed Aung San Suu Kyi from 
house arrest, and recognized her party’s win in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections.6  
Foreign investors are anxious to explore development opportunities in 
this resource-rich country, especially in the oil and gas sector, now that 
sanctions have been relaxed or altogether eliminated.7  In 2010–11, Burma’s 
revenues from natural gas exports exceeded USD 2.5 billion, and were 
expected to increase to over USD 4.1 billion in 2013.8  Oil companies 
consider Burma “under-explored,” and believe there are vast amounts of oil 
and gas yet to be discovered.9  An official from China’s North Petro-Chem 
Corporation (Myanmar) Ltd. called Burma a “sleeping petroleum giant.”10 
One economist notes, “the country has been walled away for fifty years. 
There are incredible opportunities.  That’s why the planes are full, that’s why 
the hotels are full.”11  
 However, Burma lacks robust infrastructure, especially reliable 
electricity and stable banking systems, which may ultimately dissuade many 
foreign investors.12  In 2012, Burma ranked 129 out of 155 countries on the 
Logistics Performance scale, which assesses trade- and transportation-
related infrastructure.13  Even residents in commercial districts have limited 
electricity and constant power cuts. 14   Factories must employ diesel 
generators to support a constant flow of power.15  The banking sector is 
                                                
5  Profile:  Burma President Thein Sein, BBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-asia-pacific-12358204. 
6  Timeline  Reforms in Burma, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
16546688. 
7  Rakteem Katakey, Myanmar Gets Record Investment After Years of Isolation:  Energy, BUS. WK. 
(Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-16/myanmar-gets-record-investment-after-
years-of-isolation-energy. 
8  ARAKAN OIL WATCH, BURMA’S RESOURCE CURSE:  THE CASE FOR REVENUE TRANSPARENCY IN 
THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR 4 (2012).  At the time of publication, no information on natural gas exports for 
2013 was available.  
9  Katakey, supra note 7.  
10  Simon Lewis, Burma Govt Allows Oil and Gas Firms to Name Profit-Sharing Terms, THE 
IRRAWADDY (Sep. 25, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/economy/burma-govt-allows-oil-gas-firms-name-
profit-sharing-terms.html. 
11  Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, MIZZIMA NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/business/7825-economist-questions-burmas-foreign-investment-law.html.  
12  Id.  
13  Justin Kent, Myanmar, The Last Frontier, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
connorconnect/2012/11/09/myanmar-the-last-frontier/.  
14  Id.  
15  Id.  
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underdeveloped, and until very recently, ran exclusively on cash 
transactions.16  
In response to these concerns, Burma recently revised its foreign 
investment law (hereinafter “2012 Law”) to attract foreign investors and 
their capital.17  As a result of the 2012 Law and Western countries’ loosening 
sanctions, Burma will likely face a flood of new capital.18  This influx of 
foreign investment, however, may worsen existing problems.  Burma has a 
long history of corruption and lacks transparency, especially in the oil and 
gas sectors. 19   In addition, the government has a tense and fragile 
relationship with ethnic minority populations, who historically suffered 
abuse at the hands of extractive companies and the government itself.20  This 
foreign capital may flow into investment projects that utilize forced labor, 
forced relocation, and result in environmental destruction.21 
In an attempt to address these concerns, the 2012 Law requires foreign 
companies to respect the local environment and labor standards.22  However, 
Burma’s judiciary is hardly equipped with the robust enforcement 
mechanisms needed to ensure compliance.23  The government uses judicial 
processes to silence dissidents.24  The UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights in Myanmar stated, “[t]here is no independent and impartial judiciary 
system [in Burma].”25  
                                                
16  Jason Szep, Myanmar Banking New “Wow” Factor – ATMs, REUTERS (May 30, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/us-myanmar-banking-idUSBRE84T04H20120530.  
17  Kent, supra note 13. 
18  Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, supra note 11; Burma ‘Enjoying 
Investment Boom’, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20907285. 
19  Dana Hughes & Molly Hunter, Obama Administration Declares Myanmar Open for Business 
(May 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/obama-administration-declares-myanmar-
open-for-business/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUS., No. 1, RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT IN MYANMAR:  THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION 7 (2012). 
20  ARAKAN OIL WATCH, supra note 8, at 19. 
21  See infra Part III. B. 
22  Foreign Investment Law, 2012, No. 21, ch. 11, 2(4)(c) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf [hereinafter Foreign 
Investment Law 2012].  
23   See Dominic Nardi, Discipline-Flourishing Constitutional Review:  A Legal and Political Analysis 
of Myanmar’s New Constitutional Tribunal, 12 AUSTL. J. ASIAN LAW 1, 7-8 (2010).   
24 For example, Zarganar, a famous Burmese comedian who mocked the ruling junta in his routines, 
was convicted of “public order offenses,” and received a fifty-nine-year sentence.  He was placed in 
solitary confinement for four to five years of his sentence.  Kyaw Hsu Mon, Burma Activists Urge Protest 
Law Reform, THE IRRAWADDY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/human-rights/burma-activists-
urge-protest-law-reform.html; Laura Barton, Burma’s Top Standup Comic:  ‘We Sacrifice Our Lives for 
Jokes”, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2912), http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2012/mar/09/burma-standup-
comic-zarganar?guni=Article: in%20body%20link. 
25  Nardi, supra note 23, at 8. 
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In light of this reality, foreign companies may have to go above the 
requirements of Burmese laws to ensure fair labor standards and safe 
environmental practices.  While it may be tempting to exploit this new 
frontier, it is in the best interest of foreign companies to follow principles of 
corporate social responsibility to ensure these protections, for, while they 
may not be judged in a court of law, they will be judged in the court of 
public opinion.  Companies face significant risk of lawsuits in foreign or 
international courts—foreign companies have already faced liability for 
contracting with the military to provide security for their development 
projects. 26   The world’s attention is turned toward Burma’s dramatic 
democratization, and foreign investment projects will be under intense 
scrutiny.  Therefore, socially responsible investment is in the best economic 
interest of companies. 
 This comment proceeds by examining the political, social, and 
economic history of Burma leading up to the recent democratic reforms in 
Part II.  Part III analyzes the substantive changes in the foreign investment 
law.  The 2012 Law makes several substantive changes, including: 
allowances for longer land grants, longer tax holidays, foreign currency 
accounts, joint ventures between foreigners and citizens unrestricted by 
ownership ratio requirements, and guarantees against nationalization. 27  
While these changes may not address the long-term concerns of investors, 
they will likely entice foreigners to invest in the short-term despite the 
dangers of political instability and under-developed infrastructure.28  This 
comment argues that the lack of domestic enforcement mechanisms will 
likely ensure that the 2012 Law’s socially responsible goals remain 
aspirational.  
 Part IV outlines recommendations for foreign investors doing business 
in Burma.   This comment recommends that foreign investors comply with 
the law’s goal of promoting socially responsible investment by proceeding 
cautiously in Burma’s historically corrupt oil and gas industry, engaging in 
non-financial reporting, and negotiating impact benefit agreements to ensure 
that international human rights, labor, and environmental laws are enforced.   
                                                
26  See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (granting in part and denying in part 
motion to dismiss), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 708 
(9th Cir. 2005) (granting parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss in light of settlement); A Milestone for 
Human Rights, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-
01-23/a-milestone-for-human-rights (noting insider information that Unocal will pay $30 million in 
damages to settle).  
27  Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar State Media Details New Foreign Investment Law, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/03/us-myanmar-investment-idUSBRE8A204F20121103.  
28  Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, supra note 11. 
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II.  BACKGROUND  
 Colonialism, decades of civil conflict, and repressive authoritarian 
leaders have affected Burma’s economy and inhabitants disastrously.  
Regional partners have taken a constructivist approach to their relations with 
the formerly rogue 29  nation, while other states have imposed harsh 
sanctions.30  While discussing the efficacy of the two competing approaches 
is not the focus of this analysis, understanding the international context in 
which the 2012 Law was passed is necessary to contemplate the legal 
problems and pitfalls the country will face in its near future.  
 This section examines the failed political and economic policies 
enacted by Burma in the post-colonial era and the tensions between the 
government and indigenous communities.  It goes on to analyze regional and 
international responses to these crises, and the recent warming of relations 
between Burma and other nations that set the stage for the 2012 Law.  
A.   Political and Economic History 
In 1886, Burma became a British colony.31  Led by Aung San, Burma 
negotiated its independence by joining with the Allies to stop the Japanese 
invasion of Burma in 1945.32  When framers drafted the constitution of post-
colonial Burma, ethnic minority autonomy was a divisive issue.  For decades 
a strong ethnic nationalist sentiment had been growing, “based narrowly on 
the idea of a Buddhist and Burmese-speaking people, one that saw little need 
to accommodate minority peoples,”33 which currently make up about thirty-
one percent of the population.34  Ultimately, the nationalist interests who 
                                                
29  See, e.g., Ari B. Weiss, Revolutionary Identities and Competing Legitimacies:  Why Pariah States 
Export Violence 4 (May 11, 2012) (unpublished honors thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale) 
(on file with University Honors Program at OpenSIUC) (“Rogue state” refers to nations that reject 
international norms by engaging in activities such as systematic human rights abuse, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and supporting terrorism.).  
30  Wayne Bert, Burma, China and the U.S.A, 77 PAC. AFF. 263, 277 (2004); Donald K. Emmerson, 
Crisis and Consensus:  America and ASEAN In A New Global Context 13 (paper presented at the 
international conference sponsored by Chulalongkorn University’s American Studies Program, Institute of 
Security and International Studies, and Faculty of Political Science, Hua Hin, Thailand, Jan. 8-9, 2009). 
31  Mark B. Baker, Flying Over the Judicial Hump:  A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the WTO, and the Federal Courts, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 51, 55 
(2000-01). 
32  IAN HOLLIDAY, BURMA REDUX:  GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL REFORM IN 
MYANMAR 38 (2011).  
33  Id. at 34. 
34  The Shan people constitute 9%, the Karen people constitute 7% and historically have resided in 
the eastern region, the Rhakine people make up approximately 3.5% and reside in western Burma, the Chin 
constitute 2.5% and have historically lived in western Burma near India, the Mon people make up 2% and 
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preferred one “Union of Burma” rather than a multi-ethnic state won this 
debate.35  In 1947, an assembly passed the new constitution, nominally 
acknowledging the distinct states of the Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Karenni 
tribes and giving them the option to secede from “unified Burma” ten years 
later.36  
However, many ethnic minority groups were deeply dissatisfied with 
this arrangement and protested for independence. 37   Adding to these 
tensions, Aung San, the only leader supported by both the Burmans and the 
ethnic minority groups, was assassinated, catapulting the newly independent 
nation into civil war on January 4, 1948.38  In the 1950s, while insurrections 
were common, Burma progressed democratically by holding nominally fair 
elections and establishing parliament, a bureaucracy, and an independent 
judiciary.39  But popular distrust of government institutions led to unrest, and 
the military positioned itself as the unifying state institution.40  The country 
operated under a parliamentary democracy until 1962, when a military coup 
put General Ne Win and the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(“SLORC”) in power for the next twenty-six years.41 
 Burma experienced huge economic growth during the colonial period, 
but its economy plummeted in the years following independence: in 1930 
the GDP per capita was USD 902, but it dropped to USD 396 in 1950.42  
After the British withdrew, the economy collapsed.43  Burma is rich in 
natural resources, but the government’s mismanagement of its own 
resources kept the country impoverished. 44  Ne Win ordered the 
nationalization of most industries.45  He also demonetized the kyat in 1987, 
ordering that the kyat only exist in denominations divisible by his favorite 
                                                                                                                                            
live in the southern end, and the Kachin make up 1.5% and reside in the north bordering China. Some of 
the other ethnic groups are the Wa, Rohingya, and Karenni.  UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, Briefing:  Myanmar’s Ethnic Problems, IRINNEWS (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.irinnews.org /report/95195/Briefing-Myanmar-s-ethnic-problems.  
35  HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 39.  
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 40.  
38  See generally Baker, supra note 31, at 63, 68.  
39  HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 43.  
40  Id. at 44-45. 
41  Sein Win, Sustaining Burma’s Hopes for Freedom, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 144, 145 (1994). 
42  Wonik Kim, Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia, 39 
J. CONTEMP. ASIA 382, 389 (2009). 
43  Id. at 389.  
44  INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT NO. 177, CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA 22 (2009) (stating that 
Burma’s economic problems “can be linked to a fundamental lack of knowledge and expertise on economic 
planning and policy.”).  
45  The Ne Win Years:  1962-1988, THE OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburma 
alliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
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number, nine, leaving only forty-five and ninety kyat bills.46  Without any 
forewarning or compensation, seventy-five percent of Burma’s currency was 
completely devalued, people lost their entire life savings overnight,47 and 
foreign businesses were forced out.48  Foreign investors withdrew as a result 
of Ne Win’s policies.49  The World Bank notes that net inflows of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Burma (indicating new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) fell from USD 780,000 in 1984 to USD -1,540,000 in 1987.50 
 These failed economic policies led to social unrest and political 
upheaval, resulting in mass protests in 1988, when government forces killed 
an estimated 3,000 people.51  The military government renamed itself the 
State Peace and Development Council (“SPDC”), promising democracy in 
order to regain lost international trust and foreign investment.52  The Saffron 
Revolution of 2007 brought the crisis in Burma to international attention 
again, when the world watched the SPDC violently crush a peaceful protest 
of Buddhist monks.53  General distrust of the government and popular unrest 
increased during this time period and exacerbated ethnic tensions.54   
B.   Ethnic Minority Conflicts 
“…[I]n ten years all Karen will be dead.  If you want to see a 
Karen, you will have to go to a museum in Rangoon.”  Major-
General Ket Sein, 1992. 55 
  
 Residual animosity between the government and ethnic minority 
groups stems from the colonial-era conflict centering on the establishment of 
a “unified Burma” rather than autonomous ethnic states.56  In response to 
                                                
46  Id.  
47  INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT NO. 231, MYANMAR:  THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 1 
(July 2012). 
48  Id.  
49  The Ne Win Years: 1962-1988, supra note 45.  
50  Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?page=4 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
51  Burma’s 1988 Protests, BBC NEWS (Sep. 25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7012158.stm; Crisis in Burma:  Can the U.S. Bring About a Peaceful Resolution?:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Asia, the Pac., and the Global Env’t of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 
(2007) [hereinafter Crisis in Burma]; HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 55. 
52  Crisis in Burma, supra note 51, at 3.  
53  Id. at 2. 
54 See generally Crisis in Burma, supra note 51. 
55  BENEDICT ROGERS & JEREMY WOODRUM, THAN SHWE:  UNMASKING BURMA’S TYRANT 149 
(2009) (citing BENEDICT ROGERS, A LAND WITHOUT EVIL 40 (2004)).  
56  Id. 
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ethnic groups’ armed insurrections, the government targeted these groups 
through repression and “insensitive development projects.”57  The junta 
conducted a multi-decade campaign against the ethnic groups, utilizing 
forced displacement, forced labor, and intentional deprivation of healthcare 
and food. 58   Researchers have documented the military’s practice of 
systematically entering villages, raping and/or killing villagers they find, 
burning the village, and then setting landmines for those who may return to 
recover any belongings or loved ones.59  Others are forced into relocation 
camps and used as laborers, porters, and human landmine sweepers for the 
military.60 
This “Four Cuts Strategy” was employed by the junta specifically to 
make room for and quell resistance to development projects like gas 
pipelines.61  This practice drew significant criticism from the International 
Labor Organization (“ILO”), especially given Burma’s ratification of the 
Forced Labor Convention.62  The ILO stated that the military, which targets 
civilians solely on the basis of their ethnicity,63 is “guilty of an international 
crime that is also, if committed in a widespread or systematic manner, a 
crime against humanity.”64  
 Even now, the government continues to violate the cease-fire 
agreements and has instigated attacks on civilians.65  Only days after the 
government signed a cease-fire agreement that was to put an end to the 
Kachin offensive, the Burma army began burning down houses in the Na 
Long village in Kachin state.66  The long-standing ethnic tensions will not 
likely be resolved overnight, and these are factors that investors should keep 
                                                
57  HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 95.  
58  Jeremy Sarkin & Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention Under International 
Law in the Context of the Current Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Burma/Myanmar, 33 HONG 
KONG L. J. 371, 378-80 (2003).   
59  See, e.g., FREE BURMA RANGERS, A CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY:  REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF 
BURMA ARMY OFFENSIVE AND ONGOING ATTACKS AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN KAREN STATE, 
EASTERN BURMA, UPDATED (2008).  
60  Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 8. 
61  DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY, THREAT TO PEACE:  A CALL FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
TO ACT IN BURMA 17 (2005). 
62  Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 10.  
63  DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY, supra note 61, at 35; Crisis in Burma, supra note 51, at 34 
(noting the junta destroyed more than 3,000 villages, twice as many as were destroyed in the crisis in 
Darfur). 
64  Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 10. 
65 FREE BURMA RANGERS, FBR REPORT:  BURMA ARMY ATTACKS AGAINST THE KACHIN SINCE 
CEASEFIRE DECLARED (2013); Fighting Continues in Burma Despite Ceasefire, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21190975 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
66  Id.  
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in mind when developing projects in areas historically inhabited by these 
marginalized community members.  
Poor economic policies led the country to poverty, and political and 
ethnic oppression resulted in constant unrest and violence.  While this much 
is clear, the international response to Burma’s failed policies has been 
inconsistent, and states have adopted vastly different approaches to their 
relations with the nation. 
C.   Foreign Relations: Regional and Beyond 
The events in the late 1980s and early 1990s served as a catalyst for 
new foreign relation policies in Burma.  Regional states tended to adopt a 
constructive engagement approach toward Burma, while its Western partners 
responded with sanctions and embargos. 
Burma’s neighbors have invested and traded with it for the stated 
goals of creating an empowered middle class and political base.67  The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)68 members provided 
one fourth of all foreign direct investment in Burma in the ten-year period 
between 1995 and 2005, totaling USD 1.05 billion.69   
  Generally, Western nations responded to Burma’s human rights 
abuses and the regime’s illegitimacy with mild to harsh isolationist 
policies.70  The low point in foreign relations between Burma and many 
Western nations was the violent suppression of the student uprising in 1988, 
accompanied by the regime’s refusal to recognize the results of the 1990 
election that Aung San Suu Kyi won by a landslide.71  Instead, she was 
placed under house arrest along with other prominent members of her party, 
the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), and she remained there off 
and on for the next twenty years.72  In response to these events, the United 
                                                
67  Aurélie Basha i Novosejt, E.U. Policy on Burma/Myanmar:  Trade, Investment and Political 
Trends of the Past Decade and their Implications for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in 
Burma/Myanmar 19 (2006) (unpublished report).  
68  Burma sought out a seat at ASEAN and received it in 1997, notably one month after the U.S. 
imposed harsher sanctions.  Bert, supra note 30, at 270-71; id. at 16. 
69  Patrick Strefford, Exclusionary Globalization:  Sanctions, Military Rule, and Non-
Democratization in Myanmar, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 59, 66 
(Derrick M. Nault & Shawn L. England, eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2011).  
70  Jayshree Bajoria, Understanding Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385 (June 21, 2013); Bert, supra note 30, at 
277. 
71  Sein Win, supra note 41, at 146-47 (noting the National League for Democracy, or NLD, led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, won 82% of the parliamentary seats).  
72  Id.  
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States halted its aid program and military assistance, and then imposed 
sanctions, which were renewed in 2008.73  
Likewise, the European Union imposed an arms embargo in 1990 and 
at the same time suspended most assistance other than humanitarian aid.74  
The E.U. also exempted Burma from its “Generalised Scheme of 
Preference,” thus excluding European markets as opportunities for trade.75  
The United States and the European Union tightened their sanctions 
following the Saffron Revolution of 2007.76  Australia also adopted financial 
sanctions restricting the “transfer of funds or payments to, by the order of, or 
on behalf of specified Burmese regime figures and supporters” in 2007.77  
Scholars argue that isolationist policies disproportionately hurt the 
country imposing the sanctions because other countries are free to trade with 
and invest in the sanctioned country.78  This played out in Burma as China 
became Burma’s number one investor, comprising eighty-seven percent of 
all foreign investment in 2011.79  Scholars and commentators argued that 
Burma essentially became a “client state” of China.80  Burma came to rely 
on China as its main supplier of intelligence, arms, and financial 
assistance.81  China also offered Burma an unknown amount of debt relief 
that helped to keep the regime afloat,82 and in exchange for this and its 
continued investment, Burma gave Chinese contractors an advantage in bids 
for contracts, specifically in the manufacturing, mining, power generation, 
and oil and gas sectors.83  
                                                
73  David I. Steinberg, The United States and Myanmar:  A ‘Boutique Issue’?, 86 INT’L AFF. 175, 
181-82 (2010).  New rounds of sanctions were imposed in 1997, 2003, and again in 2008.  
74  Novosejt, supra note 67, at 8. 
75  Id. at 9. 
76   CAMERON HILL, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES, 
BURMA:  DOMESTIC REFORMS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 1 (2012). 
77  Id.; Ray Brindal, Australia Removes Economic Sanctions on Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304299304577346570095628952.htm.  
78  Bert, supra note 30, at 277-79. 
79   IAN STOREY, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE RISE OF CHINA:  THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 161 (2011). 
80  STRATEGIC STUD. INST., SHAPING CHINA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:  THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE’S 
LIBERATION ARMY 298 (Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel eds., 2006); Bajoria, supra note 70; David 
Cohen, China’s Myanmar Problem, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 17, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/china-
power/chinas-myanmar-problem/.  
81  Bert, supra note 30, at 268-69.  
82  Novosejt, supra note 67, at 22. 
83  STOREY, supra note 79, at 161. It should be noted that in the past few years, Burma has made a 
point of seeking trade partnerships with other major powers to leverage China’s influence.  See generally 
Simon Shuster, Why are Burmese Scientists Studying Missile Technology in Moscow?, TIME (Dec. 7, 
2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2101404,00.html. 
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D.  Policy Shifts 
 Scholars criticize Western responses to Burma’s ongoing human 
rights abuses as serving only to punish civilian populations and ineffective in 
curbing human rights abuses or countering China’s large influence in the 
region.84 In the interest of offsetting Chinese monopolizing influence in 
Burma, ASEAN nations have largely welcomed a larger U.S. role in 
Burma.85   
 In 2010, the Burmese government made unprecedented political 
changes.  It released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, transferred power 
to a nominally civilian government led by Thein Sein, and granted amnesty 
to political prisoners.86  Burma began making democratic reforms to gain the 
support of Western states. 87   Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of 
democratic reform was recognition of Aung San Suu Kyi’s election to 
Parliament in April 2012.88  
 All of these factors—China’s growing influence in the region, lack of 
desirable results from other isolationist policies, ASEAN’s welcome of more 
U.S. presence, and small democratic reforms by Burma—recalibrated 
Western policy.  Spurred by criticisms, the Obama administration pivoted on 
its policy stance toward Burma in the fall of 2009.  While not abandoning 
sanctions altogether, the United States agreed to enter into a dialogue with 
the regime.89  The United States pressured Burma to release all political 
prisoners, urged it to comply with its international agreements, and pushed 
for the end of human rights violations in the country.90  Other nations 
responded in similar fashion.91  
                                                
84  Bert, supra note 30, at 277.  The ASEAN approach has also been criticized for failing to improve 
the situation.  See Emmerson, supra note 30, at 13. 
85  INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 44, at 31. 
86  Timeline, supra note 6.  
87  Bajoria, supra note 70. 
88  Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi wins by-election:  NLD Party, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17577620.  
89  Steinberg, supra note 73, at 191.  
90  Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. 
Department of State, Special Briefing on U.S. Policy Toward Burma (Sept. 28, 2009) (transcript available 
at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/09/129698.htm). 
91  The E.U. suspended nearly all of its sanctions on Burma in April 2012.  Thomas Fuller & Paul 
Geitner, European Union Suspends Most Myanmar Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/asia/eu-suspends-sanctions-on-myanmar.html?_r=1& (noting 
the arms embargos would remain in place).  The U.K. supported this move but made clear that the 
relaxation was contingent on Burma maintaining forward democratic progress. HILL, supra note 76, at 7.  
Japan resumed its development assistance program and began talks to develop a joint special economic 
zone.  Id. at 8. Australia revised its sanctions after the first round of political prisoner releases. Id. at 11. 
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It is against the backdrop of economic disaster, civil war, political 
repression, and decades of civil mistrust that Burma now seeks a welcome 
back on to the international stage.  Though the government has signaled 
reform, the country is still recovering from decades of oppressive rule, 
remnants of which still linger.  With internal conflict and external relations 
yet to be mended, the situation into which investors will enter is fragile. To 
incentivize international investment, Burma’s Parliament passed a new 
investor-friendly foreign investment law.92  The following section analyzes 
whether and to what extent the 2012 Law will create a positive investment 
environment both for foreign companies and Burma’s citizens.  
III.  FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW ANALYSIS 
President Thein Sein’s political reforms prompted Western nations to 
ease sanctions,93 which allowed multinational corporations to invest in this 
resource-rich country.  But most companies held their capital at bay until the 
2012 Law passed, which was meant to be friendlier to foreign investors.94  
President Thein Sein reported that foreign investment quintupled from fiscal 
year 2011/2012 to 2012/2013.95  After months of debate in Parliament, 
President Thein Sein approved Myanmar’s new foreign investment law on 
November 2, 2012.96  
Section A examines the substantive changes to the investment regime 
made by the 2012 Law, focusing on tax incentives, relaxed requirements for 
joint ventures, land grant extensions, and requirements to respect 
international labor and environmental standards.  After an examination of 
enforcement mechanisms, Section B concludes that the law is deficient in 
ensuring labor, human rights, and environmental protections in foreign 
investment projects.  These shortcomings premise the recommendations 
contained in Part IV.  
                                                
92  Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27.  
93  Burma Sanctions, supra note 4.  
94  Szep, supra note 16. 
95  Foreign Investment Jumps Fivefold in Burma, THE IRRAWADDY (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/34427.  
96  Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27; the legislative process surrounding the bill was described as “a 
tussle involving a government eager to attract foreign investment, tycoons determined to protect their 
monopolies, and small businesses keen not to be shut out.” Burma’s Thein Sein:  Foreign Investment Bill to 
be Finalized in ‘Days’, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 21, 2012), http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-
news/2012/10/21/burmas-thein-sein-foreign-investment-bill-to-be-finalized-in-days/ (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014); Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Foreign Investment Bill in Parliament Again, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-myanmar-investment-idUSBRE8A005H20121101. 
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A.   Notable Changes to the 1988 Foreign Investment Law 
The 2012 Foreign Investment law repealed the 1988 Foreign 
Investment Laws of Myanmar (hereinafter “1988 Law”).97  One of the first 
sections of the 2012 Law outlines the goals of the revision: to create jobs, 
encourage competition with foreigners, develop infrastructure and 
technology, and produce and export minerals.98  The 2012 Law focuses on 
environmental conservation and the development of clean and sustainable 
energy as important principles of foreign investment–principles that were 
absent in the 1988 version of the law.99  These changes may reflect a shift in 
thinking from short-term to long-term development goals and respect for 
international standards and norms.  The following section considers the 
law’s changes, in light of Burma’s developmental objectives, in a subject-
by-subject discussion of permitted types and patterns of investment projects, 
standards for approving and overseeing projects, financial incentives, and 
new labor and land provisions.  
1. Permitted Investments and Activities 
The 1988 Law contained few, if any, prohibitions on investment 
projects that are harmful to the environment or citizens.  It gave full 
discretionary powers to the government to decide which investment projects 
were appropriate, with few guidelines.100  
The 2012 Law contains new restrictions on certain economic 
activities.101  It restricts economic activities prejudicial to the traditional 
cultures and customs of the ethnic nationalities,102 prejudicial to public 
health, 103  and prejudicial to the natural resources, environment and 
biodiversity.104  It also limits private investment in many sectors, as outlined 
                                                
97  Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, No. 10 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf [hereinafter Foreign 
Investment Law 1988].  
98  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch.3 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
99  See id. at ch. 4 § 8(h)(j)(l). 
100  The only discernable guidelines for approving investment projects are found in Chapter VI, which 
instructs the MIC to consider “facts such as financial credibility, economic justification of the business 
enterprise and appropriateness of technology.”  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 97 at ch. VI § 9.  
101  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 98, at ch. 2.  
102  Id. at ch. 2 § 4(a). 
103  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 2 § 4(b) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
104  Id. at ch. 2 § 4(c).  
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in the Myanmar State-owned Economics Enterprises (“SOEE”) law, subject 
only to government-granted exemptions.105  These sectors include oil and 
gas, hard minerals, telecommunications, banking and insurance, 
broadcasting, and air and railway services.106    
The Foreign Investment Rules and Myanmar Investment Commission 
Notification, which outline new foreign investment regulations, detail three 
separate categories of investment and the activities that fall within each of 
them.107  Category I activities are presumed to be prohibited by foreign 
investment projects.108  These activities include, but are not limited to:  
digging shallow oil and gas wells up to 1,000 feet, small-scale agriculture, 
electrical generation under ten megawatts, production of arms and 
explosives, and exploration and production of jade and gemstones.109  The 
Myanmar Investment Commission (“MIC”) has the discretionary authority 
to approve such activities by foreign projects if it benefits the state, its 
citizens, and specifically the ethnic citizens.110  The proposals for Category I 
activities must be approved by local groups, regional administrative bodies, 
and the central government.111  Foreign capital must not exceed eighty 
percent of the joint venture between the foreign investor and a citizen, but 
there is no limit to foreign capital when the venture is between a foreigner 
and the state.112 
Category II activities are those that are only permitted as joint 
ventures with Burma citizens.113 These activities include large-scale mining, 
exploration and production of industrial minerals, certain real estate projects, 
production and distribution of most food products, and livestock or farming 
activities carried out on land owned by Burma citizens.114  As in Category I 
activities, foreign capital in a joint venture with citizens may not exceed 
eighty percent.115  
                                                
105  RAJA BOSE & NICHOLAS WATTS, K&L GATES, MYANMAR’S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 
(2012). 
106  Id.; Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 103, at ch. 2 § 4(h)-(j). 
107  MINISTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, Notification No. 11/2013, FOREIGN INVESTMENT RULES (2013); 
MYANMAR INVESTMENT COMMISSION, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, Notification No. 
1/2013 (2013); ALLEN & OVERY LLP, MYANMAR ISSUES FOREIGN INVESTMENT RULES 2 (2013). 
108  ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3. 
109  Id.; JAMES FINCH, DFDL LEGAL & TAX SERVICES, MYANMAR’S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW, 
RULES AND NOTIFICATIONS 3 (2013).  
110  ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3. 
111  FINCH, supra note 109, at 3. 
112  ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3.  
113  Id. 
114  Id.  
115  Id.  
JUNE 2014  FOREIGNERS IN BURMA  845 
Category III activities are those that are permitted subject only to 
conditions by the relevant ministry.116  Some of these activities include 
mineral production, electrical production, communication services, and 
commercial real estate.117  There is some overlap between Category II and 
Category III activities—for example, a foreign entity must undertake some 
projects jointly with a Burma citizen, subject to conditions prescribed by a 
government ministry.118  Some activities listed in Category III, such as 
exploration and production of minerals, oil, and natural gas require an 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.119  Foreign investors may 
engage in certain activities, such as coal production, only when undertaken 
as a joint venture with the state.120 
 These additional categories of restricted activities reflect the 
government’s desire to prevent harmful activities that contravene 
international human rights standards.121  Presumably, these expectations are 
codified for the benefit of potential investors as well as concerned citizens.  
The 2012 Law, however, allows prohibited activities if approved by the 
government. 122   This change gives the government discretion to allow 
investment projects in any sector, subject to approval by local civilian 
organizations and the appropriate government agencies. 123   Discretion, 
however, opens the door for potential corruption. Corruption is 
commonplace in Burma, where government officials expect to be paid off by 
businesses in exchange for licenses and a faster bureaucratic process.124    
Then again, “[…discretion] can be useful when exercised by competent and 
                                                
116  Id. at 4.  
117  Id.  
118  See id. at 3-4. 
119  Id. at 5.  
120  Id. at 4.  
121  These international standards are codified by convention, and include Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), 46 I.L.M. 
1013 (2007); International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, No. 29 (June 28, 1930); 
International Labour Organization Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No. 182 (June 17, 
1999); International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (1998).   
122  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 2 § 5 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
123  ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3. 
124  Video Showing Rampant Burmese Police Corruption Leaked Online, FRANCE 24 THE OBSERVERS 
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://observers.france24.com/content/20120920-burma-opens-video-showing-police-
corruption-leaked-internet-myanmar-amateur-traffic-bribes-bus-yangon-rangoon; Zin Linn, Burma’s 
President Urges an End to Corruption, ASIANCORRESPONDENT.COM (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://asiancorrespondent.com/87663/burmas-president-urges-to-stop-bribery-for-clean-government/.  
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experienced decision makers in a transparent process.” 125   Requiring 
approval by certain civil society groups allows civilians to veto investment 
projects that may affect their lands or livelihoods.  This development is a 
positive step that works to gain indigenous communities’ input in 
development decisions, per the requirements laid out in international 
conventions.126  However, it is unclear whether and how this mechanism will 
be enforced.  Given Burma’s long history of corruption and lack of 
transparency, it is not clear that this restriction will be effective in practice.   
2. Permitted Patterns of Investment 
 Chapter 5 of the 2012 Law outlines the permitted “Patterns of 
Investment,” which is the successor to the 1988 Law’s “Form of 
Organization” chapter.  Both chapters set forth guidelines under which 
foreign investments can be formed and carried out.127  Some of the main 
changes made to attract foreign capital occur in this section.  The 1988 law 
envisioned foreign investment with up to 100% foreign capital as well as 
joint ventures between foreigners and citizens, which required a minimum of 
thirty-five percent foreign capital.128  The 2012 Law envisions similar types 
of investment:  
 
(1) a sole proprietorship wholly owned by a foreign investor 
supplying 100% foreign capital; (2) a joint venture in the form 
of either a partnership or limited company with a citizen or 
government department or organization, in which the amount of 
foreign capital invested is to be agreed to by the foreign 
investor and the citizen investor; and (3) operating in a system 
mutually agreed upon according to a deed of contract.129 
                                                
125  Jared Bissinger, Investment, discretion and Burma’s future economic development, DEMOCRATIC 
VOICE OF BURMA (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.dvb.no/analysis/investment-discretion-and-burma% 
E2%80%99s-future-economic-development/24904 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
126  “1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of 
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy 
or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and 
cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation 
of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly.” 
International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (1998), art 7 (1).  
127  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 122, at ch. 5; Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 
4 (Myan.), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.  
128  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 127, at ch. 4.  
129  MYANMAR LEGAL SERVICES LIMITED & CHANDLER & THONG-EK, DOING BUSINESS IN MYANMAR 
1 (2012).  
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The 2012 Law departs from the 1988 Law in that it does not set a minimum 
requirement of foreign capital in joint ventures.130  This difference allows for 
a more flexible pattern of investment depending on the abilities and needs of 
foreign investors as well as local partners.  The MIC, however, still has final 
approval of the ratio of foreign to local capital, and a specified amount of 
foreign capital is still required in certain restricted sectors.131  
The 2012 Law outlines, for the first time, the duties and 
responsibilities of investors.132  It prescribes eleven investor duties, from 
abiding by the existing domestic laws of Burma to refraining from 
significantly changing the topography of the land.133  It outlines seven rights 
given to investors, such as the right to sell all or part of their shares, and the 
right to apply to the MIC to settle grievances.134   
However, investors gain many of these rights only upon approval of 
the MIC, which leaves a large zone of uncertainty for investors.135 Wide 
discretion opens the door for corruption to permeate relationships between 
investors and members of the MIC during the approval process.136    
The 1988 Law failed to provide any dispute settlement mechanism, 
which created an uncertain legal environment for foreign investors.137  The 
2012 Law sets forth available methods for dispute resolution, allowing for 
disputes to be settled according to the terms of the contract. 138  This 
development allows investors to add international arbitration clauses in their 
contracts, which creates a more certain and attractive legal environment than 
having to litigate disputes under Burmese law. 139 
 This set of provisions attempts to set up an attractive environment for 
potential investors by allowing more flexible patterns of investment.  The 
2012 Law attempts to level the playing field, drawing in investors by letting 
them play on their own terms.  
                                                
130  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 127, at ch. 14 § 6(a)(ii).  
131  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 5 § 10 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf; ALLEN & OVERY LLP, 
supra note 107, at 3-4. 
132  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 131, at ch. 8.  
133  Id. at chs. 8, 17. 
134  Id. at chs. 8, 18. 
135  Id. 
136  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 8, 18 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
137  See generally Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 4 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf. 
138  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 136, at ch. 19. 
139  Id.; Bissinger, supra note 125.  
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3. Activities of the MIC 
 The 1988 Law created the MIC, which is responsible for reviewing 
applications for investment proposals, issuing permits upon approval, 
responding to complaints lodged by investors, and enforcing the provisions 
of the law.140  The 2012 revisions to the 1988 Law retain the MIC, but alter 
its composition.141  The 2012 Law mandates that non-government servants 
have seats on the MIC142 in addition to government employees,143 and that 
the Vice President, Secretary, and Joint-Secretaries of the MIC be 
nominated.144  This shift could reflect the Pyidaungsu Government’s desire 
to improve the MIC’s credibility by bringing in non-government actors to 
oversee the process of assessing investment projects and enforcing the 
provisions of the foreign investment law.  The non-government members, 
however, are on the government’s payroll.145  Thus, these non-government 
members may be susceptible to inappropriate government influence.   
 The addition of non-government actors to the process may limit the 
potential for corruption in relationships between investors and the MIC, 
especially given the MIC’s wide latitude to dictate the scope and substance 
of investment projects.146  President Thein Sein has outwardly opposed the 
systematic use of bribery that exists at every level of government, and this 
new requirement for the MIC likely is a step in the battle against corruption, 
imposing another check on accountability against government officials.147  
Non-government officials, however, are not immune to bribery, and the 
effectiveness of this accountability check is questionable.148   
The 2012 Law sets out new and detailed requirements for the MIC.149  
Going forward, the MIC is required to make a report of its activities every 
                                                
140  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 137, at ch. 6. 
141  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 6 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
142  Id. at ch. 6 § 11(a).  
143  Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 5 § 7 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf. 
144  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 141, at ch. 6 § 11(a)(2) (noting that Chapter 6 does not 
prescribe the procedure for nomination and election to the MIC).  
145  Id. at ch. 6 § 11(b). 
146  See generally Bissinger, supra note 125. 
147  Zin Linn, supra note 124. 
148  A government official states bribery is not limited to the public sector, but pervades the private 
sphere as well.  Paul Vrieze, Burma Ranked Among Most Corrupt Countries, THE IRRAWADDY (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www.irrawaddy.org/corruption/burma-ranked-among-most-corrupt-countries.html.  
149  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 7, 9 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
JUNE 2014  FOREIGNERS IN BURMA  849 
six months.150  Additionally, the 2012 Law sets forth time limits under which 
the MIC must either accept or reject proposals.151  The MIC must monitor 
the mineral resources that are under the contracted land, whether or not they 
are related to the contracted project or works.152  These sections clarify what 
investors can expect from the MIC and how long they will have to wait for 
an assessment of their proposals.153    
The 2012 Law seems to give investors more rights and privileges, 
subject to certain conditions.154  For example, the prior version of the law 
gave the MIC the power to “prescribe” the bank used,155 while the 2012 Law 
only gives the MIC the power to reject a proposed bank.156  The ability to 
choose which bank to use is a boon for investors, theoretically allowing 
flexibility to make financial decisions.  The MIC, however, still maintains 
the power to reject a proposed bank, 157  highlighting the MIC’s vast 
discretionary power to dictate investors’ activities.   
The 1988 Law did not outline any rights of the MIC to enforce the 
laws against violating investors. The 2012 Law outlines penalties the MIC 
may issue to investors who violate laws and regulations.158  The MIC may 
issue a warning, temporarily suspend tax exemption and relief, revoke the 
permit, or blacklist the investor from obtaining a permit in the future. 159  
This clarification allows the investor to determine what penalties she may 
face if she fails to uphold the law.   
Generally, the 2012 Law outlines more detailed duties and rights of 
both the investors as well as the MIC.  Investors, however, only hold many 
of these rights subject to the discretionary approval of the MIC.  While the 
changes to the MIC are certainly notable, the 2012 Law provides more 
dramatic shifts to the financial incentive regime.  
                                                
150  Id. at ch. 7 § 12(d). 
151  Id. at ch. 9 § 20.   
152  Id. at ch. 7 § 12(h). 
153  Id. at ch. 9 § 20. 
154  See generally Bissinger, supra note 125. 
155  Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 6 § 15 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf. 
156  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 7 § 13(f) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
157  Id. 
158  Id. at ch. 18. 
159  Id. at ch. 18 § 42.   
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4. Financial Incentives 
The 2012 Law provides more flexibility for investors in their financial 
dealings.  Under the 1988 Law, foreign investors were required to use the 
state-owned Myanmar Insurance Corporation, 160 but the 2012 Law provides 
investors the right to use any insurance agency that is allowed to do business 
in Burma.161  The Myanmar Insurance Corporation was the sole insurance 
company for forty years, but in September 2012 Burma announced that it 
would grant licenses to twelve private domestic insurance companies.162  
Once the sector develops, foreigners can choose insurance providers.   
The 1988 Law grants foreign investors tax exemptions for up to three 
consecutive years in order to encourage investment.163  The chapter allows 
for an extension of this tax holiday if the investment is “beneficial” for the 
state, and an exemption from other payments such as customs duties and 
export taxes.164   The 2012 Law extends the tax holiday from three years to 
five years in an attempt to even further encourage investment. 165   Its 
exemptions and restrictions are identical to those contained in the 1988 Law; 
for instance, companies can claim exemptions on only fifty percent of their 
profits on products produced for export.166  One of the most important 
provisions of the 2012 Law is the discretionary power given to the MIC to 
“prescribe investment activities which are not required for tax exemption 
and relief.”167  These select exemptions are important because blanket tax 
holidays have the potential to undercut much of Burma’s desperately needed 
tax revenue.168  The analysis, however, notes that like all other discretionary 
                                                
160  Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 8 § 19 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.  
161  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 10 § 23 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
162  Kyaw Hsu Mon, Private Insurance Industry Finds its Feet, THE IRRAWADDY (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/z_lifestyle/private-insurance-industry-finds-feet.html.  
163  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 160, at ch. 10.  
164  BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105; Burma:  Amended Foreign Investment Law Published, U.S. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403415
_text. 
165  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 161, at ch. 12 § 27(a); Foreign Investment Law 1988, 
supra note 160, at ch 10 § 21(a).  
166  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 161, at ch. 12 § 27(d); Foreign Investment Law 1988, 
No. 10, ch. 10 § 21(d) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.  
167  Bissinger, supra note 125; Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 7 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
168  Bissinger, supra note 125. 
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powers of the MIC, there is potential for abuse, and a transparent process of 
assessing which companies are eligible for exemptions is necessary.169 
 The 1988 Law required foreign investors to open both foreign 
currency and kyat bank accounts in a bank prescribed by the MIC,170 
whereas the 2012 Law allows them to use a foreign currency accounts or a 
kyat accounts.171  The 1988 Law imposed the same requirement on foreign 
citizens employed by “any such economic organization,” while the 2012 
Law also allows foreign citizens to choose whether to open a foreign 
currency or kyat account. 172   Again, the 2012 Law provides financial 
incentives for investors by extending blanket tax holidays and offering more 
choices to foreigner investors regarding their financial dealings.  
5. Labor and Land Provisions 
 The 1988 Law requires foreign investors to hire Burmese citizens for 
in-country permitted activities, except for experts and technicians (who may 
be hired from abroad). 173   The 2012 Law prescribes more detailed 
requirements.  For example, the law requires that all unskilled hires must be 
citizens, 174  and that investors provide training and courses for citizen 
employees. 175   It also strictly prescribes certain percentages of skilled 
workers, technicians, and staff who must be Burmese citizens, with 
requirements increasing over time.176  Section 24(a) requires that when 
hiring skilled workers, investors hire at least twenty-five percent citizen 
laborers within the first two years of the project, at least fifty percent of 
citizen laborers within the second two years, and at least seventy-five 
percent within the following two years.177 
                                                
169  Id.  
170  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 166, at ch. 14 § 27.   
171  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 167, at ch. 17 § 40(b). 
172  Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 14 § 28 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf; Foreign Investment Law 
2012, supra note 167, at ch. 17 § 41.   
173  Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 172, at ch. 9 § 20.  
174  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 11 § 24(c) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
175  Id. at ch. 11 § 24(b). 
176  Id. at ch. 11 § 24. 
177  Id. at ch. 11 § 24(a).  One analyst argued that this requirement could be counterproductive by 
raising the wages of workers who are already in high demand, thus bringing the cost of investment up and 
deterring investors.  Bissinger, supra note 125 (“For example, export oriented investors may locate in other 
countries if, despite low costs for unskilled labour, managerial and skilled labour wages make Burma 
internationally uncompetitive.  The [MIC] must find a balance with growth in wages and employment 
opportunities, both skilled and unskilled, and do so in a transparent and predictable way.”). 
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The 2012 Law also requires that investors pay Burmese citizen-
employees the same wages as foreign employees of similar professional 
levels,178 and that investors obey labor laws.179  The requirement that foreign 
investors obey labor laws is likely intended to guard against the use of 
forced labor, which is common in Burma’s public works sector.180   While 
the possibility of this provision leading to domestic investigations of forced 
labor is low given the weakness of Burma’s judiciary,181 it may very well 
provide further support for ILO investigations into forced labor and 
violations of international labor law.182 
 The 1988 Law did not contain a provision on land leases.  However, 
according to recently developed common practice, investors may lease land 
for up to thirty-year terms with two available extensions of five years 
each.183  The 2012 Law extends the terms and allows land leases of up to 
seventy years, up from the prior forty year maximum.184  Now investors 
have the right to obtain a land grant for up to fifty years and to extend that 
initial grant twice, for up to ten years each185⎯a change specifically 
designed to attract foreign investors.186  Even longer leases of land are 
available in rural or less developed areas, subject to the discretion of the 
MIC.187  This section is a significant attraction for foreign investors who are 
not allowed to own land in Burma188 and because the government has 
engaged in rampant illegal land seizures for investment projects in the 
past.189 
 The government extended land grant terms to attract foreign capital by 
guaranteeing investors more time to get a return on their investment.  
                                                
178  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 174, at ch. 11 § 24(f). 
179  Id. at ch. 11 § 26(b).  
180  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 11 §§ 24(f), 26(b) (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
181  See supra Part I. 
182  See generally Forced Labour Complaints on the Rise in Burma, says ILO, MIZZIMA NEWS (June 
9, 2011), http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/5390-forced-labour-complaints-on-the-rise-in-
burma-says-ilo.html. 
183  Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27. 
184  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 180, at ch. 14 § 32. 
185  Id. 
186  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 14 §§ 31, 32 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
187  BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105. 
188  The Transfer of Immovable Property Restriction Act, 1987, No. 1 (Myan.), available at 
http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/THE-TRANSFER-OF-IMMOVEABLE-PROPERTY-
RESTRICTION-ACT-1987.pdf.  
189  Abuses, Land Grabs Ongoing in Burma, Says NGO, MIZZIMA NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/regional/8336-abuses-land-grabs-ongoing-in-burma-says-ngo.html.  
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Alternatively, the new requirements for hiring Burmese workers are oriented 
toward developing a civilian workforce.  Reflecting her view that 
responsible investment has the potential to improve the lives of Burma’s 
citizens, Aung San Suu Kyi recently urged investors and corporate 
executives to invest in the country’s human resources and develop small and 
medium enterprises.190  The Burmese worker requirement could help to 
grow employment opportunities, creating a skilled workforce that can 
support the country’s economy.   
B.  Shortcomings of the New Foreign Investment Law  
The 2012 Law champions environmental protection, respect for 
international labor standards as outlined by the ILO, and the protection of 
ethnic nationalities.191  It lacks detailed enforcement mechanisms, however, 
which are necessary to protect these interests.  The law lacks any clear 
mechanism for legal remedies available to citizens who are illegally 
removed from their land to accommodate a foreign investment project, or for 
the investors themselves in the event that a contract is terminated in 
violation of the 2012 Law.192   
Burma’s history of internal adjudication suggests that the country will 
not honor these commitments. 193   Burma is not a signatory to certain 
international treaties that protect investors’ rights, such as the Washington 
Convention or the Energy Charter Treaty.194  The judicial system in Burma 
lacks transparent processes and clear rules and is not an ideal forum for 
foreigners to attempt to enforce their rights. 195  Without a binding 
                                                
190  Shibani Mahtani, Suu Kyi Seeks Responsible Investment in Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 21, 2013), 
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-333789/.  
191  Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 186, at chs. 1, 4, 11.  
192  Construction of the Yadana pipeline in the 1990’s through Burma led to a series of serious human 
rights violations, including forced relocation of villagers along the route of the pipeline.  In 1996, villagers 
filed a class action lawsuit against Unocal, a California oil company, in federal district court for subjecting 
them to relocation, forced labor, torture, rape, and murder.  Manuel Velasquez, Unocal in Burma, SANTA 
CLARA UNIVERSITY (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/Unocal-in-
Burma.html. 
193  See supra Part I. 
194  BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105, at 4; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (“Washington Convention”), Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159, 17 U.S.T. 1270; Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), Apr. 16, 1988, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.  
195  BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105, at 4; James Ross, Burma Push for Freedom is Held Back by its 
Institutionally Corrupt Courts, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfr
ee/libertycentral/2012/mar/20/ burma-judicial-system. 
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international treaty, foreign investors will have to utilize Burmese law in 
settling disputes unless another method is set forth in the contract.196   
Scholar and international human rights litigator Terry Collingsworth 
highlighted some of the difficulties in enforcing human rights norms, noting 
“[a]nother shortcoming of the contemporary regime is that most human 
rights instruments focus on the conduct of the governments and assume that 
they will adequately enforce national criminal and civil laws against private 
actors.”197  There are, however, two implicit problems with this assumption. 
First, foreign companies have the option to choose under what conditions 
and under what legal regime disputes involving them will be addressed:198 
 
Multinational corporations seeking to enforce commercial 
rights enjoy the tremendous advantage of being able to opt out 
of national legal systems that are corrupt, unreliable, or non-
functioning. For example, an oil company forming a joint 
venture with the government of Burma can require the 
government to agree that all disputes be resolved using the 
English legal system, applying the substantive law of England. 
Meanwhile, Burmese victims of human rights violations 
perpetrated by the company's security forces would be left 
without recourse under national law, since it would be futile—if 
not dangerous—to complain to a government whose military 
engages routinely in similar abuses.199 
 
The 2012 Law codifies this practice by expressly allowing investors to 
contract out dispute resolution procedures.200  
This difference in treatment highlights the second major problem.  
When the government itself perpetrates the illegal conduct, and the country 
lacks a robust and transparent judicial system, citizens face a practical 
impediment in their ability to seek legal redress. 201   The Burmese 
government historically allowed and even expressly engaged in forced labor 
                                                
196  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 19 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.  
197  Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge:  Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 184 (2002).  
198  Id. at 185.  
199  Id. at 184-85.  
200 Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 196, at ch.19. 
201  See Nyein Nyein, Interference in Judicial System Harming Burmese People:  Lawmakers, THE 
IRRAWADDY (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/suu-kyi/interference-in-judicial-system-harming-
burmese-people-lawmakers.html.  
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and relocation,202 environmental and agricultural degradation,203 and ethnic 
minority oppression.204  A notable example that exemplifies many of the 
previously mentioned abuses is the Yadana Pipeline.  Unocal, a U.S. oil 
company, and Total, a French oil company, contracted with Burma to build a 
pipeline that would divert Burma’s oil into Thailand.205  Burma provided 
security to the project.206  Various human rights organizations reported that 
in providing security to the pipeline, the Burmese junta actually forced 
ethnic citizens to work on the project and to relocate without compensation 
under threat of imprisonment or execution.207   
Currently, the Shwe Gas Project, a project of Daewoo International 
that would funnel natural gas and oil from the Bay of Bengal into China, 
raises similar concerns and has stirred mass protests.208  Villagers living 
along the route of the pipeline have reported land confiscation–more land 
being taken from them than what was sold, speculators coercing villagers to 
sign contracts they cannot read, and the non-materialization of promised 
compensation.209  There are many allegations of rampant physical and sexual 
abuse, unsafe working conditions, and predatory recruiting of children 
attending nearby schools who can be paid half the wage of an adult male.210  
Villagers also report environmental degradation, such as foreign 
subcontractor Punj Lloyd allegedly dumping waste into fishing areas, 
causing a fifty percent decrease in fishing yields.211  The Yadana and Shwe 
pipelines are merely two examples of investment projects that have had 
disastrous consequences for the environment as well as the lives and well-
being of the Burmese people.  But this does not have to be Burma’s future.  
Through their investment projects, foreign businesses have an opportunity to 
“ensure equitable growth and development” for Burma by focusing on rural 
development and small enterprises, and practicing transparency.212 
                                                
202  Anna E. Johansson, A Silent Emergency Persists:  The Limited Efficacy of U.S. Investment 
Sanctions on Burma, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 317, 324 (2000).  
203  Id. at 324-25. 
204  Id. at 325-28. 
205  EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, Doe v. Unocal Case History, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/ doe-v-unocal-
case-history (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
206  Id.  
207  Velasquez, Unocal in Burma, supra note 192.  
208  BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, Shwe Gas & Myanmar-China Oil Transport 
Projects (Apr-Jun 2013) (Mar. 26, 2014),  http://businesshumanrights.org/Documents/.  
209  SHWE GAS MOVEMENT, DRAWING THE LINE:  THE CASE AGAINST CHINA’S SHWE GAS PROJECT, 
FOR BETTER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN BURMA 16 (Sept. 2013).  
210  Id. at 21-23. 
211  Id. at 26. 
212  Mahtani, supra note 190. 
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 Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the 2012 Law will not 
likely improve Burmese workers’ rights or protect the environment.  Foreign 
investors, however, should not disregard the law’s aspirational objectives.  
Indeed, investors who implement environmentally-friendly practices and 
respect human rights standards will benefit economically by fostering peace 
on the ground and a positive public image abroad. The following section 
explores the advantages to foreign investors who respect their obligations 
under Burmese law and international labor and human rights standards,213 
and provides recommendations to foreign investors on how to respect these 
obligations in a country with a long history of labor, human rights, and 
environmental abuse. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 In light of the new, friendlier foreign investment law, foreign 
companies are increasingly attracted to the Burmese market.214  The 2012 
Law protects labor and human rights.215  Guarantees against environmental 
destruction are meant to provide rules for responsible foreign investment 
activities.216  The author questions, however, whether domestic mechanisms 
are adequate to ensure compliance with these guarantees, both for foreign 
companies as well as their domestic business partners. 217   Despite the 
inadequacy of domestic enforcement mechanisms in Burma, foreigners 
retain the duty to respect these protections.  Although they may not be 
judged in a Burmese court, they will be judged in a court of public opinion.   
 The 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (hereinafter “Guiding Principles”) reflect the duty of states and 
businesses to protect and respect human rights and to remedy human rights 
abuse.218  The Guiding Principles have been endorsed by the U.N. and are 
                                                
213  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, ILO Forced Labour Convention, ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and ILO 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, supra note 121. 
214  See Eric Rose & Nina Dunn, Inside:  Investing in Myanmar and Diving into a New Labor Pool, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/02/17/inside-investing-in-myanmar-
and-diving-into-a-new.  
215  Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 4 § 8(h)(j)(l); 2 § 4 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
216  See id. at ch. 4 § 8(h)(j)(l); 2 § 4(b)(c)(d)(e).  
217  Senior State Dept. officials admit that while the U.S. companies operating in Burma will be held 
to “best practices” standards, they will not be enforceable by U.S. law, Hughes & Hunter, supra note 19. 
218 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles], at 1. 
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accepted as “the most internationally authoritative statement in this area.”219  
They frame the responsibility to respect human rights as the responsibility of 
businesses to “avoid infringing on the rights of others and [to] address 
adverse impacts with which they are involved.”220  
 The Guiding Principles recognize the lack of existing remedies for 
individuals who suffer corporate-related human rights abuse.221  As John 
Ruggie, author of the Guiding Principles, states himself, “. . . beyond labor 
standards that impose obligations on states, not on companies directly, no 
globally endorsed rules and tools existed to further realize a right remedy in 
relation to business.”222  The Guiding Principles are, by definition, merely 
principles that businesses and states should follow in order to respect human 
rights.  Their status as principles reflects the lack of like binding obligations 
under international law.223  The Guiding Principles serve as a foundation to 
the emerging doctrine of business and human rights, and reflect a growing 
acceptance among government and businesses that their responsibility to 
respect human rights extends beyond the letter of the law, whether domestic 
or international.  
In an age where consumers are increasingly apt to boycott products 
from companies known to violate human rights, fair labor practices, and 
environmental protections,224 promoting corporate social responsibility does 
not just satisfy a vague ethical obligation, but has concrete effects on a 
company’s profits.  One author notes the link between “practical social 
values” and “public expectations regarding business conduct,” exemplified 
by the fact that poor press regarding a company’s respect for human rights or 
the environment “can undo hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
marketing.”225  In the mid-1990’s, successful consumer boycotts resulted in 
major American companies Reebok and Levi Strauss pulling out of Burma, 
and helped contribute to the imposition of U.S. sanctions. 226   Thus, 
                                                
219 Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  Charting an 
Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 33, 41 (2012).  
220 Guiding Principles, supra note 218, at 13.  
221 John Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and ‘New Governance Theory’:  Lessons from Business 
and Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 5, 13 (2014).  
222 Id.  
223 Blitt, supra note 219, at 44 (“Yet the term responsibility, as opposed to duty or obligation, is 
intended to indicate that respecting rights is not currently an obligation that international human rights law 
generally imposes directly on companies, although elements of it may be reflected in domestic law.”). 
224  Onyeka Osuji, Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Human Rights:  Non-Financial 
Reporting as an Option, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 83, 101 
(Derrick M. Nault & Shawn L. England eds., Palgrave MacMillan 2011). 
225  Id. at 99. 
226  Novosejt, supra note 67, at 17. 
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companies should not underestimate the power of consumers to demand 
responsible business practices. 
A company can face liability for violating human rights norms as laid 
out in international law in international courts or in domestic courts through 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.  For instance, the litigants in Doe v. Unocal 
used the Alien Tort Statute in a U.S. court227 to sue the U.S. oil company 
Unocal for its complicity in atrocities such as forced relocation, forced labor, 
murder, and rape committed by the Burmese army during the Yadana 
pipeline project in Burma.228  After years of litigation, Unocal finally settled 
out of court with the Burmese citizens for an undisclosed amount.229  The 
settlement is estimated to be in the multi-million dollar range, while 
Unocal’s legal fees were likely over USD 25 million.230  In 2005, the French 
oil company Total settled with Burmese villagers and paid out EUR 5.2 
million in compensation for their use of forced relocation in their investment 
project.231  Though courtroom doors have begun to close, litigants still 
attempt to bring cases like this before domestic and international judiciaries 
through statutes such as the Alien Tort Statute in the United States or in the 
Spanish National Court,232 which has recognized “universal jurisdiction” 
over human rights abuses that occur abroad.233  
Foreign businesses should respect international standards of fair labor, 
environmental protection, and human rights even without codification in 
Burmese law.  This obligation does not make the 2012 Law and the 
                                                
227  However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited the ability of plaintiffs to sue under the Alien 
Tort Statute for violations of international law committed extraterritorially in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. et al., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
228  EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, supra note 205. 
229  Id. 
230  Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees Settlement with Burmese Villagers, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 
14, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/15/burma.duncancampbell.  
231  Novosejt, supra note 67, at 31. 
232  However, Spain’s ability to prosecute under “universal jurisdiction” continues to be limited by 
Spanish lawmakers. See Ashifa Kassam, Spain Moves to Curb Legal Convention Allowing Trials of 
Foreign Rights Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/11 
/spain-end-judges-trials-foreign-human-rights-abuses; THE CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, 
Spanish Congress Enacts Bill Restricting Spain’s Universal Jurisdiction Law, 
http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=740; Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge:  
Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, INT’L LABOR RIGHTS FORUM (Mar. 1, 2002),  
http://laborrights.org/news/11493. 
233  See Doe v. Unocal Corp., supra note 26; John Doe v. Exxon Mobil, No. 09-7125, 2011 D.C. Cir. 
(holding that companies are liable under the ATS); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, No. 01-03208-CIV (S.D. 
Fla. filed July 21, 2001); Villeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, No. 1-3399-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed 
Aug. 30, 2001). 
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protections and guarantees outlined in it superfluous, as it provides specific 
and concrete obligations to investors.234  
In light of the previous considerations, foreign companies investing in 
Burma should set up mechanisms to ensure compliance with both domestic 
and international labor, environmental, and human rights standards 
whenever conducting business in Burma, a country with a lurid history of 
corruption and abuses. Specifically, foreign investors should:  1) agree to 
undertake projects only where impact benefit agreements are successfully 
negotiated; 2) proceed cautiously in Burma’s historically corrupt oil and gas 
industry; and 3) engage in non-financial reporting in order to ensure 
compliance with international human rights and environmental standards.  
A.  Recommendation 1: Foreign Investors Should Agree to Undertake 
Projects Only Where Impact Benefit Agreements are Successfully 
Negotiated 
 Impact Benefit Agreements (“IBAs”) are voluntarily negotiated 
agreements between an affected local community and the private company 
that owns a project on or near land inhabited by the community.235  These 
agreements are usually negotiated with little government involvement.236 
IBAs serve the indigenous community by recognizing their presence and 
authority; it serves the company by fostering local support for projects that 
would otherwise be met with resistance.237  Points of discussion usually 
center around “recognition of rights; royalty-type payments; opportunities 
for employment and training; opportunities for community economic 
development; and additional environmental and cultural protection 
measures.”238  Foreign investors involved in development projects in Burma 
can respect indigenous communities’ rights through constructive dialogue 
and agreeing to terms that are beneficial to both parties. 
 The IBA model is consistent with international conventions and 
guidelines outlining the rights of indigenous communities, particularly as 
they pertain to extractive industry projects.  These obligations are outlined 
most robustly in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
                                                
234  See Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 4 § 8(h)(j)(l); 2 § 4 (Myan.), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf. 
235  Jason Prno, Benjamin Bradshaw & Dianne Lapierre, Impact and Benefit Agreements:  Are They 
Working? 1 (Paper presented at the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum Annual 
Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia, May 11, 2010) at 3. 
236  Id. 
237  Id. 
238  Id. 
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(“UNDRIP”) and in the International Finance Corporation’s Performance 
Standard 7, which details the requirement of Free Prior Informed Consent 
(“FPIC”).239  An increasing number of extractive industry companies are 
adopting the FPIC standard in their practices.240  Of the twenty-eight oil and 
mining companies surveyed in one report, five employed FPIC standards, up 
from only two in a 2009 Oxfam report.241  Notably, nearly all of these 
companies have faced allegations of serious human rights abuses at their 
project sites in the past, and two have been the subject of Alien Tort Statute 
litigation in the United States over their alleged violations of international 
law.242  These companies now employ progressive policies requiring full 
negotiation and cooperation with affected communities prior to project 
construction in order to ensure they receive “social license” to continue.243   
 IBAs have been utilized successfully in Canada to deliver benefits to 
indigenous communities affected by mining projects.244  Similar to Burma, 
Canada has sizable indigenous populations that inhabit lands on or near 
extractive industry projects. 245  Canada has a robust Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”) requirement whereby companies must consult with and 
accommodate affected communities, to which IBAs merely add.246  No such 
robust procedural requirements exist in Burma; for that reason, the need for 
                                                
239  U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 121;  “FPIC . . . will be 
established through good faith negotiation between the client and the Affected Communities of Indigenous 
Peoples.  The client will document:  (i) the mutually accepted process between the client and Affected 
Communities of Indigenous Peoples, and (ii) evidence of agreement between the parties as the outcome of 
the negotiations. FPIC does not necessarily require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals 
or groups within the community explicitly disagree.”  Performance Standard 7:  Indigenous Peoples 3 
INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GROUP (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a
79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  
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For the private sector, it’s a bottom-line issue and it also promotes responsible spending. When 
communities become unhappy and begin protesting against a particular project by blocking roads or 
shutting down production facilities, projects become riskier.”  Free, Prior and Informed Consent:  
Protecting Communities, MINING, PEOPLE & THE ENV’T, http://www.mpe-magazine.com/reports/free,-
prior-and-informed-consent-Protecting-communities (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
241  Id. 
242  Oxfam Calls on Mining Company to Respect Human Rights, OXFAM AMERICA (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press//oxfam-calls-on-mining-company-to-respect-human-
rights/?searchterm=None (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy 
582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); Company Profile:  
Xstrata, CROCODYL (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.crocodyl.org/wiki/xstrata.  
243  Free, Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 240.  
244  Prno, Bradshaw & Lapierre, supra note 235.  
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IBAs in Burma is even more acute.247  Canadian companies have gone 
beyond the requirements of the EAs and chosen to voluntarily negotiate 
IBAs because they recognize the importance of gaining “social license,” or 
community support, for their projects.248  Companies engaged in extractive 
industry projects in Burma will find, as Canadian companies have, that it is 
actually in their best interests to surpass the bare requirements of the law. 
 Researchers analyzed fourteen IBAs negotiated by diamond mining 
companies in Canada and assessed whether they met four general goals:  
building positive relationships between the companies and Aboriginal 
communities; delivering benefits to the Aboriginal community; building 
capacity in the Aboriginal community; and ensuring follow-up to the 
environmental assessment process.249  Between 1989 and 2007, there were 
positive trends in income,250 employment and education rates, and business 
opportunities within Aboriginal communities that had IBAs with mining 
companies at rates that exceeded growth in the entire Northwest 
Territories.251  Despite these positive trends, affected communities perceived 
some shortcomings of IBAs, most notably:  job training was limited to blue 
collar mining positions; benefits received by the community were trinkets 
and beads compared to the company’s monetary profits; the confidentiality 
of IBAs prevented communities from knowing whether they received their 
due; not all segments of the community were meaningfully included in the 
IBA negotiation; and environmental impacts of the projects were not 
mitigated.252  Foreign companies in Burma should take these critiques into 
account when negotiating their IBAs.   
 IBAs are uniquely positioned to provide benefits to both indigenous 
communities and foreign businesses in Burma.  First, IBAs are negotiated 
solely between the community and the business, entirely outside the 
regulatory framework or purview of the state.253  Though the concept of “a 
private company . . . lay[ing] claim to recognition of aboriginal rights 
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through an unlegislated confidential agreement”254 has the potential to be 
problematic, contractual recognition of indigenous rights and interests could 
be an improvement to the situation of indigenous communities in Burma.  In 
light of the Burmese government’s violent suppression and exploitation of 
indigenous communities, 255  especially for the purpose of promoting 
extractive industry projects, IBAs may provide affected communities with 
the recognition and autonomy they would otherwise be without if left to the 
state.  Secondly, IBAs that include authentic profit-sharing terms and allow 
full participation by affected communities within the negotiation process 
could develop local human capacity and resources that, until now, have 
never been meaningfully engaged by private companies.   
 Historically, development projects have forced indigenous 
communities off their land, with violence if necessary.256  The government 
and companies have not sought affected communities’ input and have not 
acknowledged their complaints—this has led to protests en masse against 
investment projects.257  An IBA negotiation model could foster relationships 
of trust between affected communities and private companies, decreasing the 
incidents of conflict surrounding projects and leading to positive economic, 
educational, and social trends.258 
B.  Recommendation 2: Foreign Investors Should Proceed Cautiously in 
Burma’s Historically Corrupt Oil and Gas Industry 
 Transparency International259 ranked Burma as the world’s third most 
corrupt country in 2011 on their Corruption Perceptions Index.260  Perhaps 
more than any other sector in Burma, the oil and gas sector has historically 
suffered from corruption and a lack of transparent practices.261  In 1996, an 
analyst from The Nation alleged that the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas 
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Enterprise (“MOGE”) “is the main channel for laundering the revenues of 
heroin produced and exported under the control of the Burmese army.”262  In 
the same year, eighty percent of the foreign direct investment in Burma was 
centralized in the oil and gas sector alone.263  The requirement that foreign 
investors in the oil and gas sector must partner with MOGE exposes 
investors to continuing complicity in this corrupt sector.264  
 With much of the resource-rich land lying in territory historically 
inhabited by indigenous groups,265 these groups are often forcibly relocated 
by the government and subjected to violent conflict because of extractive 
industry projects. 266   The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) notes that one of the unique problems faced by 
foreign investors in the extractive resources industry is the inability to 
insulate themselves from local conflict surrounding their operations. 267  
Investors must hire security forces to protect their employees.268  The 
Burmese army has provided security forces to past projects such as the 
Yadana pipeline, where the army committed serious human rights abuses 
against the community along the path of the pipeline.269  Thus, investors in 
the oil and gas industry risk abusing indigenous populations through forced 
relocation and violence while supporting corrupt government entities, which 
runs afoul of an investor’s obligations under international law, Burmese law, 
and most likely, the company’s home country’s laws. 270  
 Despite this risk, companies can take steps to proactively reduce their 
negative impacts on local populations and the environment, and reduce their 
interaction with corrupt institutions.  The OECD report notes that many 
companies find that diffusing local conflict is in the best interest of their 
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projects’ stability.271  One way a company could do this is by encouraging 
revenue sharing agreements between the state and the local communities 
affected by the projects.272  
The 2012 Law does not target anti-corruption efforts in the oil and gas 
sector.273  A few of the provisions aspire to minimize the role of state 
institutions in investment projects.274  The 2012 Law also bans total foreign 
ownership of projects in the natural resource sector, meaning that any 
foreign businesses in the extraction sector will likely be forming joint 
ventures with the MOGE.275  Some analysts suggest that bringing foreign 
investment to Burma may decrease corruption because foreign companies 
will be subject to their countries’ own anti-corruption bills, thus raising the 
standard for business dealings there.276  Foreign investors have independent 
obligations not to engage in corruption stemming from sources like the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and U.K. Bribery Act.277  Companies should 
therefore be aware of the risk of corruption and work hard to reduce it.   
 Since the 2012 Law does not attack political corruption, foreign 
investors in the extraction and natural resource sectors should proceed 
cautiously, being aware of the historical corruption rampant in MOGE.278 
Foreign investors should be especially careful in subcontracting out security 
forces, making sure to communicate standards for acceptable practices, such 
as using non-lethal force, reporting any use of force, and providing medical 
aid to injured persons. 279   Investors should also consider options for 
diffusing local conflict beforehand by encouraging resource sharing between 
MOGE and the local communities and engaging in projects that will benefit 
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the local communities, such as providing social services like hospitals and 
developing clean drinking water systems.280 
C.  Recommendation 3: Foreign Investors Should Engage in Non-
Financial Reporting to Ensure that International Labor Laws and 
Environmental Protection Standards are Enforced 
 Provisions of the 2012 Law aim to ensure compliance with 
international labor standards and guard against forced labor, consistent with 
the Guiding Principles and relevant international treaties.281  The 2012 Law 
requires foreign companies to train employees, pay them the same wage as 
foreign employees of the same skill level, and obey relevant labor laws.282  
The ILO provides a few mechanisms by which local citizens can file 
complaints of these types of abuses.283  Since the complaint mechanism was 
established in 2007, it has received 749 complaints as of June 2011, and the 
number is dramatically increasing as more citizens become aware of the 
mechanism.284  However, the ILO notes that as of February 2011 there were 
five individuals who remained in prison as a result of submitting a 
complaint, a sign that many people may be hesitant to report violations for 
fear of retaliation by the government.285  The IHRB report notes that one of 
the major concerns of the 2012 Law is that the surge of investors will be 
tempted to engage in illegal land-seizures.286  An ILO report says that, while 
new laws attempt to guard against this possibility by requiring people to 
register their land with the government, many people in rural areas are 
unaware of these requirements, and thus are unable to avail themselves of 
these protections.287  
In light of these concerns, it is questionable whether the government 
will properly enforce such labor standards.  Foreign investors should support 
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government efforts to inform the citizen population of their land rights and 
availability of complaint mechanisms, especially in rural areas of Burma.  
This proactive approach complies with the international standard of free 
prior informed consent.288  Advocates fear that the increasing numbers of 
investment projects will accelerate the practice of land grabbing; companies 
must ensure that their land contracts do not engender coercion or force and 
with the assurance that citizens have been informed of their rights and have 
given over free, prior informed consent.289   
Human rights organizations and civil society groups continue to press 
governments to require more robust reporting.290  For example, the U.S. 
Department of State now requires any U.S. individual or entity that enters 
into a new agreement with MOGE to notify the Department of State, and 
any U.S. individual or entity that invests more than USD 500,000 in Burma 
to provide annual reports detailing their human rights, worker rights, anti-
corruption, and environmental policies and procedures, as well as any 
arrangements with security service providers, property acquisitions, and any 
payments over USD 10,000 made to the government of Burma.291   As of 
May 2014, eight companies submitted reports on their investment in Burma 
pursuant to these requirements.292  Human rights organizations critique the 
reporting requirements for not going far enough.293  Hercules Offshore, an 
oil and gas company, complied with the requirements though it omitted the 
names of their local business partners, thus preventing the public from 
overseeing investment activities and impeding the purpose of the public 
reporting requirement.294  Other companies failed to disclose due diligence 
information, claiming certain privileges as a “passive” investor or as one 
without full operational control over the investment.295  Even in the absence 
                                                
288  Id.  
289  Id.  
290  See EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, FIRST MYANMAR INVESTMENT DISCLOSURES PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES 
AND CHALLENGES, July 10, 2013, http://www.earthrights.org/campaigns/first-myanmar-investment-
disclosures-present-opportunities-and-challenges. 
291  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, GEN. LICENSE NO. 17, July 11, 
2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/burmagl17. 
pdf; HUMANRIGHTS.GOV, RESPONSIBLE INV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1, 3-5, available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Responsible-Investment-Reporting-
Requirements-Final.pdf.  
292  Embassy of the United States, Rangoon, Burma “Reporting Requirements,” available at 
http://burma.usembassy.gov/reporting-requirements.html 
293  EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, FIRST MYANMAR INVESTMENT DISCLOSURES PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES, supra note 290.  
294  Id.  
295 Id.  
JUNE 2014  FOREIGNERS IN BURMA  867 
of government-sponsored reporting requirements, companies can and should 
publish such due diligence reports to the public.  
Companies operating in Burma should utilize non-financial reporting, 
a corporate social responsibility marker whereby companies publicize their 
compliance with the law.296  Dr. Onyeka Osuji, an expert on corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”), notes that non-financial reporting has become more 
important, as more businesses recognize the impact of CSR on profits.297  By 
providing the public with information detailing the particular company’s 
activities in Burma, non-financial reporting can assure the public that 
companies take CSR seriously.298  A report might include how the company 
limits its environmental impact, trains its citizen employees, ensures that its 
laborers are not being coercively employed, and provides social services and 
benefits to the rural communities where their projects are located.299  Since 
these are self-made reports, credibility is an issue.300  Osuji notes Kasky v. 
Nike, where Nike paid the Fair Labor Association USD 1.5 million after it 
was discovered that Nike’s report that it was paying its workers “on average 
double the minimum wage” was false.301  While companies may be tempted 
to fudge the numbers, the price of doing so is steep.  Consider non-financial 
reporting a means of corporate advertising, for “poor press regarding a 
company’s respect for human rights or the environment ‘can undo hundreds 
of millions of dollars worth of marketing.’”302   
V. CONCLUSION 
 Burma’s new foreign investment bill serves as a welcome mat to 
foreign investors, ushering them in and unlocking the country’s vast 
resources.  The 2012 Law will surely entice companies with its tax holidays, 
longer land leases, and more flexible joint partnership procedures.  It may 
even placate investors’ consciences with its aspirational goals of promoting 
responsible investment in accordance with international human rights, fair 
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labor, and environmental standards.303  The law, however, does not provide 
sufficient mechanisms to ensure these protections are enforced.   
 Foreign companies should recognize their duty to respect domestic as 
well as international standards not only out of fear of legal consequences, 
but out of recognition that their profits will ultimately feel the weight of their 
decisions in Burma.  Consumers care about corporate social responsibility 
and will be especially attuned to these issues in Burma, as the world watches 
to see whether its democratic reforms are permanent.  Through negotiating 
IBAs, foreign investors can build trust with indigenous communities and 
bypass problematic state interference in their attempt to pursue responsible 
corporate policies and practices.  Foreign investors should invest cautiously 
in the oil and gas sector; encourage revenue sharing between the state and 
local communities; and diffuse conflict on the ground through providing 
social services.  By engaging in non-financial reporting, companies will 
model transparency and assure the world that the mistakes of the past are not 
repeated.  
 If foreign investors take steps to ensure these protections, maybe they 
can do more than just avoid a financial loss—perhaps they can play a pivotal 
role in bringing a country out of economic ruin and placing it back on the 
map as a flourishing society in all respects. 
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